Which religions practice monotheism

We observe nothing of the sort, however. On the contrary, the unity of the world, the fact that it exhibits a uniform structure, that it is a single cosmos, strongly suggests some sort of unity in its cause—that there is either a single designer, or several designers acting cooperatively, perhaps under the direction of one of their number.

This evidence does not force us to conclude that there is only one designer, and the ablest proponents of the argument have recognized this. Nevertheless, in the absence of compelling reasons for postulating the existence of two or more cooperating designers, considerations of simplicity suggest that we ought to posit only one designer. Some have thought that the existence of evil and apparent disorder is best explained by postulating conflicts between two or more opposed powers.

Whether this is true or not, evil and apparent disorder provides no reason for preferring the hypothesis of several cooperating designers to the hypothesis of a single designer. That is, having once decided that natural good and natural evil are consequences of the operation of a single system of laws, and that their cause must therefore be unitary , the existence of evil and apparent disorder is to longer relevant to the question of monotheism although it may be relevant to the question of the goodness of the cause.

His argument is roughly this:. But as it stands it suffers from two weaknesses. But in a stronger sense, x is a causally sufficient condition of y if and only if given x alone , y exists or occurs. The inferences from 4 to 5, and from 6 to 7, are valid only upon the assumption that if a cause is sufficient to produce an effect no other cause is a necessary condition of that effect. But this is true only if a causally sufficient condition is such that it alone suffices to produce its effect, that is, if it is causally sufficient in the strong sense.

Suppose, for example, that Abel would exist if and only if Adam and Eve were to freely copulate, and Adam and Eve would freely copulate if and only if God were to create them.

Theists with robust views of human freedom, for example, will deny that they are. The problem, in short is this. In either case, the argument is unsound. Both defects can be remedied, though. Even theists with robust views of human freedom would presumably endorse. For if the first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of every other concrete object, then the second god is not a causally sufficient condition in the strong sense of the existence of any contingent being.

Similarly, if the first god is a causally sufficient condition in the strong sense of the existence of at least one contingent being, then the second god is not a necessary condition of the existence of at least one concrete object that is distinct from itself. And, of course, similar conclusions are true of the second god. For consider the following argument:.

Premise 1 has been doubted, however. Thomas V. Morris has suggested that, for persons to be distinct, all that is needed is the possibility that their wills differ. Suppose for example, that it is impossible for x to will A and for y to will not- A and vice versa but that it is possible for x to will A and for y to neither will A nor will not- A and vice versa.

Their wills could thus differ although they could not conflict. Is this sufficient to ensure distinctness of persons, though? It is not clear that it is. If I somehow cannot will anything that is opposed to what some other person wills, my selfhood or identity as a separate person appears endangered.

And if the impossibility is not merely contingent but logical or metaphysical, the threat to my independent identity seems even greater. But this aside, it is doubtful that the wills of two essentially omnipotent beings, at least, could differ in the manner Morris suggests. For suppose they can. Then, where x and y are both essentially omnipotent, and s is some contingent state of affairs that is within the range of omnipotence, x can make y impotent with respect to s and vice versa.

For even though it is intrinsically possible for y to determine whether or not s will occur, x , merely by willing s , makes it impossible for y to will not- s. Whether or not s occurs, in other words, is no longer up to y. Yet surely, if y is essentially omnipotent, and s is within the range of its power as it must be if y is essentially omnipotent , no contingent circumstance of this sort could make it impotent with respect to s. Premise 1 thus emerges unscathed.

Since the proof is valid and its other premises appear unexceptionable, the argument from omnipotence seems sound. But if God is understood in the second way, Ockham thinks that it cannot be shown that there is only one god. Even if Ockham is right about this, it does seem impossible that there be two gods. For it appears to be a conceptual truth that God is unsurpassable. If he is, then, if there were two gods each would be unsurpassable. If there were two unsurpassable beings, however, our devotion and commitment should be divided between them.

Since they are equally perfect, it would be inappropriate to be totally devoted or unconditionally committed to either one of them. But if it would, then neither of them would be God. So if it is a conceptual truth that God is unsurpassable, he must be unique. There are at least two possible problems with this argument, however. First, the inference from 6 to 7 might seem suspect.

The truth of 10 implies the falsity of 7. Because the two cases are dissimilar. In the first, neither obligation is indefeasible; each can, in principle, be trumped by other stronger obligations. While I indeed have prima facie obligations both to return the gun and to not return it, the only actual obligation I have in the circumstances that were described is the obligation to not return the gun.

By contrast, both of the obligations referred to in 7 are indefeasible. Their indefeasibility appears to be part of the very concept of divine worship; part of what it means to be God is to be such that no other obligation can take precedence over our obligation to be totally devoted and unconditionally committed to him. Both are therefore actual, and not merely prima facie, obligations.

That I am obligated to worship both deities thus seems to entail that I can worship both deities. The inference from 6 to 7 seems sound. Another possible problem concerns the truth of Thus, Thomas Morris has objected that one could be unconditionally committed to each of two distinct beings provided that their wills were necessarily harmonious. For if their wills were necessarily harmonious, they could not require of us conflicting acts.

This objection should be discounted, however, because the wills of distinct persons are necessarily opposable. See discussion in section 5 above. But the best answer is probably this. The devotion that God requires appears, then, to be inherently indivisible.

In sum, neither of the two problems presents an unsurmountable difficulty for the argument from total devotion. No discussion of monotheism would be complete which failed to note that some major theistic traditions contain strands which, on their face, seem at odds with their commitment to monotheism.

Consider the Kabbalah, for example. The Zohar after identifies the first principle with the En Sof or infinite unlimited. Because it lacks attributes, the En Sof is incomprehensible and thus, in a strict sense, non-personal although it reveals itself as personal. The hidden God manifests itself in the sefirot, however. A brief discussion of the first three will be sufficient for our purposes.

The first is, perhaps surprisingly, characterized as Nothing or the Abyss. Both Wisdom and Intelligence emerge or emanate from the Crown. The idea exists at this stage in a confused and undifferentiated form, however. Wisdom is sometimes pictured as a fountain which springs out of Nothingness the Crown and from which the other sefirot will flow, sometimes as a seed or germ from which everything develops, and sometimes as a point.

But matters become still more problematic in an influential treatise that was composed in Provence around , and falsely ascribed to Hai Goan. Whatever one thinks of this, there are striking similarities between the two doctrines.

But there are also important differences. Nor was this criticism easily laid to rest. Rabbi Azriel of Gerona d.

Still, the Kabbalah is only one strand within Judaism. By contrast, the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the divinity of both Vishnu and Lakshmi, are firmly rooted at the very heart of Christianity and Shri Vaishnavism, respectively. Perhaps as a result, these traditions have devoted much more thought to reconciling monotheism with elements which, on their face, seem at odds with it. Or, alternatively, a causally necessary condition of the existence of every contingent being and the causally sufficient condition [in the strong sense] of the existence of at least one of them.

For the sake of brevity we will focus exclusively on the simpler case, however. The argument from sovereignty can be deployed against the Trinity only if the relevant property is regarded as an attribute of each member of the Trinity rather than of the Trinity as a whole that is, of the Trinity considered as a single concrete entity. The Western or Augustinian Tradition does not. Another view, though, is implicit in the position of many second and third century church fathers, some western Christian Platonists, and the Eastern Orthodox Church as a whole.

But all share a common specific or generic essence namely, divinity , so that each member of the Trinity is eternal, necessarily existent, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and the like. Because the creative volition of any member of the Trinity entails that the other two will the same thing, if any one of them wills the existence of a contingent being, then they all will it. And, of course, the creative volition of any member of the Trinity is also a necessary causal condition of the existence of contingent beings.

It would seem, then, that there are three creative volitions, each of which is a causally sufficient and causally necessary condition of the existence of contingent beings. There are thus three sovereign creative wills, and this appears to contradict the monotheistic claim that sovereignty is necessarily unique. Appearances may be deceiving, however. It is therefore not causally sufficient for the occurrence of s in the strong sense of sufficient condition employed in the argument from sovereignty, namely, that x is a causally sufficient condition of y in the strong sense if and only if, given x alone , y exists or occurs.

In that sense, there is only one causally sufficient condition of the existence of contingent beings, and that is the joint operation of the necessarily concurrent wills of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Either there is only one will which is part of the one divine essence or the distinct wills of the three hypostases necessarily concur. The religion, which began in the s, was started in Jamaica, and is associated with dreadlocks, marijuana smoking, and chanting.

However, all of these things are symbolic, and followers of the religion, which are close to 1,, people, also believe that Haile Selassie, the former Ethiopian emperor , is the Second Coming of Christ. You will often see the Ethiopian flag displayed proudly by Rastafarians. Rastafarians keep their hair long because of a verse in the Bible from Leviticus, and smoke marijuana as a symbolic gesture.

They do not eat processed food, and many are vegetarians. Those who eat meat generally only eat fish, and they do not drink milk, eat salt, or drink alcohol.

Caodaism is a religion that was founded in Vietnam in Tay Ninh in Like other religions, followers of Caodaism are highly focused on prayer.

They also honor their ancestors, live non-violent lives in all senses of the word, and are vegetarians. The Vietnamese government estimates that there are about 4. Most of the followers are Vietnamese, though the religion is spreading into Europe, North America, and Australia. Babism is an offshoot of the Abrahamic religions, which can be traced back to the teachings of the Biblical figure, Abraham. So, like Christianity, Judaism, and other religions, those who worship the God of the Israelites, Babists have similar beliefs.

Babism is a very small religion with only a couple of thousands of followers. Most of them live in Iran. Sikhism can be traced back to the 16th century. Though it started small, with only nine followers , today, Sikhism has more than 20 million people who call themselves Sikhs.

Most of them live in India, though there are also almost , in the UK and several thousand in the United States. Sikhs believe in a single God, whom they believe protects and guides them. Though Sikhs have rituals, they believe that people should prove their goodness with their actions instead of their ritual.

Themes of honesty, hard work, generosity, and servitude are all important to Sikhs. Islam can be traced back to Judaism, just like Christianity, and all three religions have similarities. Basically, you can trace this divide all the way back to Muhammad. Their religious practices center on self-realization and understanding in order to regain awareness of that divine nature of the soul.

God the Parent desires humanity to live joyous, optimistic, and caring lives. Tenrikyo developed within a polytheistic culture, however, so some older documents give the impression that Tenrikyo is polytheistic. Actively scan device characteristics for identification. Use precise geolocation data. Select personalised content. Create a personalised content profile. Measure ad performance. Select basic ads. Create a personalised ads profile. Select personalised ads. Apply market research to generate audience insights.

Measure content performance. Develop and improve products. List of Partners vendors. Share Flipboard Email. Catherine Beyer. Wicca Expert. Updated August 12, Cite this Article Format. Beyer, Catherine. Monotheistic Religions of the World. Satanic Figures Across Multiple Religions. Introduction to the Raelian Religious Movement. The Beliefs and Practices of Rastafari.